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This paper extends on the gripping analysis of possible consequences of
the anticompetitive behavior of Microsoft Corporation in the market
for computer operating systems oﬀered in Hall and Hall (2000). It is
concluded that the model of Hall and Hall oﬀers much more reason to
be suspicious of Microsoft’s actions and intentions, as well as argument
to further-reaching punishment than foreseen in the current remedy
proposal, and than the authors themselves acknowledge.
1 Introduction
In a remarkable paper in this journal, Chris and Robert Hall propose a
model of the market for personal computers (PC’s) that come shipped with
a pre-installed operating system (OS).1 The model oﬀers an interesting un-
derstanding of the competitive process in this market, and particularly the
perverse inﬂuence of Microsoft Corporation thereon. By means of slight-of-
hand calibrations, it allows Hall and Hall to obtain a crude estimate of the
social damages that derive from Microsoft’s attempts to maintain a domi-
nant position for its OS, Windows, by raising the costs necessary for potential
competitors to produce a viable alternative—for example through Microsoft’s
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1secrecy around the hidden API’s in Window’s source code, its vaporware
strategies and the company’s legal threats. These costs are estimated at $6
billion over the next ﬁve years.
Essentially, the model is a static limit-price model, where the sunk costs
behind which Microsoft, as the incumbent ﬁrm, can hide and raise the price
of Windows are the development costs of so-called ‘self-supply’ OS’s for PC
manufacturers. By raising these development costs through some of the
strategies mentioned, Microsoft can correspondingly increase the limit price
of Windows, and thus its proﬁts.
Hall and Hall argue quite convincingly that the type of model they pro-
pose is a plausible description of actual competition in the PC market, by
observing—as others have in U.S. vs. Microsoft Corp.—that the sales price
for Windows, some $60, is far less than the price Microsoft could have asked
for its OS, if it indeed had a monopoly and faced no threat of entry. In their
calibrated version of the model, Hall and Hall estimate this true monopoly
price to be equal to $813.2 The argument presses their model as quite ﬁtting
indeed, as it leads to the conclusion that the barrier to entry that forces the
price of Windows OS down to $60 is in the order of $9 billion for developing
a viable alternative OS to Windows from scratch.3 Hall and Hall celebrate
this eﬀect as a
“...great victory for virtual competition: not only is the price
2 There is a slight ommission in the derivation of this price, that leads to an under-
estimation of the potential competition eﬀect even. The monopoly price would maximize
Microsoft’s proﬁts, given the relationship between the price for Windows and that of PC’s




















and that of Windows $895 (that is, the marginal costs of producing a computer), instead
of the $813 that follows from equation (4) on page 189.
3 Again, the presented version of the model is slightly peculiar, as it is stated that
one of the M PC producers considers ‘self-supplying’ an OS, yet calculations are carried
out with M +1 producers henceforth. Correction for this leads to barrier of entry of about
$11 billion at a price for Windows of $60, which is substantial. In the following, we will
remain to the original speciﬁcation in Hall and Hall (2000).
2of Windows brought down to a small fraction of its monopoly
price, but the social waste of duplicative investment in operating
systems is avoided as well.” (op.cit., p.189, right column)
And rightly so. However, it is not the merit of Microsoft that it materializes.
Quite the contrary. It has been Microsoft’s objective to raise the investments
necessary for potential competitors to produce alternatives to Windows OS,
by all sorts of means—and for this it was indeed convicted. Therefore, it is
very well possible that the $9 billion are mostly of Microsoft’s making. The
true cost may well be far lower. Just to get the idea, in the extreme case
in which the copyright protection of Windows OS were fully lifted, the costs
would drop to nil, i.e., the cost of making a copy of Windows.
The truly interesting question to pose to the model of Hall and Hall,
therefore, concerns the order of magnitude of the welfare eﬀects of Microsoft
raising the barrier of entry to the OS market. Hall and Hall (2000) provides
all the tools necessary for this, yet does not quite perform the analysis to this
eﬀect. In fact, Hall and Hall consider somewhat of the opposite: a lowering
through antitrust measures of the developments costs from $9 billion to $7
billion. And for this case, they oﬀer the very crude welfare measure of the
costs of a higher price of Windows (and consequently PC’s) for computer
purchasers, the $6 billion mentioned above—a number they, moreover, take
seriously enough to argue that any penalty for Microsoft’s wrongdoing should
not exceed it.4 Naturally, it would be more appropriate to consider the dead-
weight welfare loss that Microsoft creates with its behavior in the PC market.
Particularly since the Hall and Hall model oﬀers such a gripping setup for
this, we extend their analysis in this direction, in an attempt to obtain a
slightly more precise quantiﬁcation of the eﬀects of Microsoft’s conduct.
2 An Analysis of Dead-Weight Loss
The level of development costs of a ‘self-supply’ OS that Hall and Hall ﬁnd
explains the present price of Windows OS of $60 is, as said, $9 billion. If
indeed this level is higher than strictly necessary due to Microsoft’s strategic
behavior, the social costs of this anticompetitive behavior depend on the
level of development costs necessary without Microsoft’s inﬂationary conduct.
Naturally, estimates of such would-be costs are hard to come by. Insight into
4 Op.cit., p.190 right column.
3the damage potentially done can be obtained, however, by considering the
percentage by which Microsoft possibly raised the costs of producing a viable
alternative to Windows over the true production costs, Dtrue, thereof. Let
this percentage be d, thus deﬁned as
d =
9 × 109 − Dtrue
Dtrue
.
The Harberger triangle under the estimated demand for PC’s in the Hall and
Hall model is then quite readily derived for diﬀerent values of d. The equi-
librium price for PC’s that derives from the level of costs for a self-supplied
OS is deﬁned by their equation (7). For any level of d, the corresponding













where  = 2 is the elasticity of demand, c = 895 are the marginal costs
of producing a computer, α = 24.496 million is a demand parameter, and
K = 2.5 billion are the ﬁxed productions costs of a PC manufacturer.5














The eﬀect of lowering development costs from $9 to $7 billion through
antitrust intervention, as considered by Hall and Hall, then is already sub-
stantial: to d = 2
7 corresponds a rise in computer prices from $981.5 to
$991.7, a corresponding drop in sales from 622.9 to 610.1 million, resulting
in a dead-weight loss of $126.3 million. For several non-speciﬁc values of d,
running from zero up to Microsoft quadrupling the true costs of developing
an alternative to Windows OS, the table below displays the damages.
5 The somewhat speciﬁc value of α is not explicit in Hall and Hall (2000), but follows
by close approximation from some of the numbers they report. The analysis turns out to
be very sensitive to the value of α, which originally may have been 25 million.
4d pd (in $) Qd (in millions) DWL (in millions of $)
0 991.7 610.1 0
1
4 982.6 621.5 57.2
1
2 976.2 629.7 98.0
3
4 971.4 635.9 128.7
1 967.7 640.8 152.9
11
2 962.3 648.0 188.2
13
4 960.3 650.7 201.4
2 958.5 653.1 213.1
21
2 955.7 657.0 232.0
3 953.6 659.9 246.1
Table 1: Possible damages from Microsoft raising the barrier of entry into the OS
market from $2.25 billion to the present $9 billion.
Clearly, the social costs associated with Microsoft’s anti-competitive be-
havior are, even when the company indeed succeeded in quadrupling the
development costs of an alternative to Windows from $2.25 billion to the
$9 billion, only small relative to total sales—and total welfare in this mar-
ket, for that matter.6 Still, and for Harberger triangle standards, they are
substantial and cause for concern.
3 A Note on Possible Penalties
Hall and Hall put as a cap on possible penalties for Microsoft the gain in
returns to the company of raising the price of Windows through increasing
the barrier to entry from $7 to $9 billion—which they ﬁnd is $6 billion, see
below. They argue that:
“If the creation of those artiﬁcial barriers was Microsoft’s only
wrongdoing, then the damages owed to past purchasers of com-
puters should be based on a similar dollar amount. More ag-
gressive punishment of Microsoft (such as breaking it up into
competing entities) that lower shareholder value by more than
$6 billion, may fail the standard of ﬁtting the punishment to the
crime.” (op.cit., p.190, right column)
6 Note that these estimates are quite conservative, with regards to note 3.
5Again, this conclusion is a little quick, and in need of correction—particularly
now that the weakening of US. vs. Microsoft Corp. by the Court of Ap-
peals’ February 2001 partial dismissal of the complaint of monopolization of
the browser market through the predatory distribution of Internet Explorer,
helped by ill-timed public appearances of Judge Thomas Penﬁeld Jackson
and a shift in political power in the US, have created an atmosphere in
which a settlement proposal that basically allows Microsoft to get away with
just the promise to better its life is about to be taken over by the court.
In order to prevent felonies of this kind—and a felony it is, according
to the Sherman Act—any penalties are to balance the expected beneﬁts of
breaking the law. If not, other companies in similar circumstance may well
conclude that the antitrust authority shoots with feather. What would be
an appropriate penalty is, of course, quite diﬃcult to determine. The ex ante
probability that the intended anticompetitive strategy will be a success plays
a role, just as that of being caught in the act. Also, anticompetitive behavior
can be costly, and the beneﬁts when they are a success not easy to determine
up front.
Yet, to get an impression of the extra proﬁts Microsoft might have had
its eye on, the model of Hall and Hall oﬀers a handle again. Quite straight-
forwardly, it allows for identifying the increased returns to Microsoft Corpo-
ration for any level of d, as follows. The price of Windows, rd, derives from
that of PC’s, pd, by equation (8). It reads
rd =
"








in which M = 11 is the number of (identical) PC manufacturers. Conse-
quently, the following table, in which ∆Rd is the extra return from raising
the barrier by the factor d, is readily ﬁlled.7
Clearly, Microsoft’s potential gains have been substantial. That alone
gives suﬃcient reason for levying a hefty ﬁne. Yet, the model oﬀers clues for
more concern still—concern that was, in fact, behind the original break-up
proposal. Microsoft’s strategy has been costly to the company at the time
it was chosen in at least two ways—that is, apart from the antitrust mea-
sures it now faces. Firstly, to increase the development costs of potential
7 Hall and Hall’s case, leading to the increase of pd from $981.5 to $991.7, results in an
increase in rd from $49.8 to $60.4, and consequently to the increased beneﬁt to Microsoft
of $6 billion ($5.8 billion).
6d rd (in $) Qd (in millions) ∆Rd (in billions of $)
0 60.4 610.1 0
1
4 50.9 621.5 5.2
1
2 44.2 629.7 9.0
3
4 39.2 635.9 11.9
1 35.3 640.8 14.2
11
2 29.7 648.0 17.6
13
4 27.6 650.7 18.9
2 25.7 653.1 20.1
21
2 22.8 657.0 21.9
3 20.6 659.9 23.3
Table 2: Extra returns to Microsoft from raising the barrier of entry into the OS
market from $2.25 billion to the present $9 billion.
rivals requires direct expenses in advertizement and legal campaigns, and,
for example, the giving away of Internet Explorer. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, however, Microsoft forewent proﬁts by setting a limit price in an
attempt to maintain its dominant position.
Suppose that the ﬁrst type of costs are negligeable—typically, they are
not, but that only fortiﬁes our conclusions. Then consider the critical level
of the indirect costs below which Microsoft would no longer opt for a limit
price strategy. This can be established as follows. The indirect costs of the
limit price strategy are the sacriﬁce of the alternative behavior, which in the
present model is sharing the market with a ‘self-supplier’. The return of
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is Microsoft’s share in OS market in the asymmetric
Cournot equilibrium that establishes—cf. Hall and Hall’s equation (6)—
and the price of Windows r is expressed in that of PC’s p using equilibrium














Interestingly enough, the level of D that just equates Racc and Rlimit is
around $17.8 billion. Below that level, an accommodation strategy would
have delivered a higher proﬁt than one of entry deterrence. Or, to put it dif-
ferently, given Hall and Hall’s speciﬁcations, accommodation leads to a proﬁt
maximizing price of Windows of $250, a corresponding price of $1173.3 per
PC and, therefore, materializes as Racc = $57.4 billion. So, even if Mi-
crosoft was able to quadruple the level of development costs—at no direct
costs, mind you—it would have raised its proﬁts more than two times over
its chosen strategy of entry deterrence by accommodating entry into the OS
market. Hence, Microsoft’s revealed strategy of limit pricing at $60, be-
hind a possibly self-raised barrier of $9 billion—and provided one accepts
the Hall and Hall model as plausibile—indicates that the company expected
to beneﬁt from its anticompetitive behavior in the OS market in other ways,
and more, than just the extra proﬁts in the existing market. If instanta-
neous proﬁts would have been the objective, the company would either have
raised the barrier further—possibly it was kept from doing so out of fear for
antitrust investigation—or it would have opted for a strategy of accommo-
dation. Keeping entrants out has obvious long term beneﬁts, such as hinder-
ance of technical advance of viable alternatives to Windows, dominance in
the access to subscription software—predicted as the future of software—or
a lock-in of programming languages to Microsoft’s advantage. There is am-
ple reason to think these considerations played a role in Microsoft’s conduct.
They should weigh in remedy deliberations.
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